Race And Wealth Disparity: The Role Of Law And The Legal System by Moran, Beverly & Wildman, Stephanie M.
Fordham Urban Law Journal
Volume 34 | Number 4 Article 2
2007
Race And Wealth Disparity: The Role Of Law And
The Legal System
Beverly Moran
Vanderbilt University
Stephanie M. Wildman
Santa Clara University
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj
Part of the Other Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Fordham Urban Law Journal by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more
information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.
Recommended Citation
Beverly Moran and Stephanie M. Wildman, Race And Wealth Disparity: The Role Of Law And The Legal System, 34 Fordham Urb. L.J.
1219 (2007).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj/vol34/iss4/2
Race And Wealth Disparity: The Role Of Law And The Legal System
Cover Page Footnote
The authors thank Ivy A. Flores, John B. Lough, Jr., Professor Daniel M. Schneider, and Professor Leon
Trakman for their helpful comments and support. Special thanks to Jennifer Alesio, for superlative research
assistance and incisive commentary.
This article is available in Fordham Urban Law Journal: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj/vol34/iss4/2
\\server05\productn\F\FUJ\34-4\FUJ408.txt unknown Seq: 1  6-SEP-07 9:20
RACE AND WEALTH DISPARITY: THE ROLE
OF LAW AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM
Beverly Moran* and Stephanie M. Wildman**
Many authors in the forthcoming book Race and Wealth Dispari-
ties: A Multidisciplinary Discourse assume that law plays some role
in the creation and maintenance of wealth disparities based upon
race.1  Yet some lawyers, judges, legislators, professors, and law
students would strongly dispute that view.  Many legal workers,
like other Americans, believe in a legal system that aspires to, and
often achieves, neutrality in matters of class and equality in matters
of race.2  They do not view law and the legal system as one way
that American society polices race and wealth disparities.  Because
American law seems removed from race and wealth concerns, legal
workers see no place for such considerations in their education or
practice.
* Copyright  2007 by Beverly Moran, Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University.
Another version of this essay will appear as a chapter in RACE AND WEALTH DISPAR-
ITIES: A MULTIDISCIPLINARY DISCOURSE (Beverly Moran ed., forthcoming 2007).
** Copyright  2007 by Stephanie M. Wildman, Professor of Law and Director,
Center for Social Justice and Public Service, Santa Clara University.  The authors
thank Ivy A. Flores, John B. Lough, Jr., Professor Daniel M. Schneider, and Professor
Leon Trakman for their helpful comments and support. Special thanks to Jennifer
Alesio, for superlative research assistance and incisive commentary.
1. RACE AND WEALTH DISPARITIES:  A MULTIDISCIPLINARY DISCOURSE (Bev-
erly Moran ed., forthcoming 2007).  Most of the chapters in this text, by authors from
disciplines ranging from sociology and psychology to history, economics, and literary
criticism, consider the relevance of law to their discipline. See, e.g., Tony N. Brown &
Daniel B. Cornfield, A Selective Review of Sociological Perspectives on the Relation-
ship Between Race and Wealth, in RACE AND WEALTH DISPARITIES, supra (laws ef-
fecting unionization); William J. Collins & Robert A. Margo, Racial Differences in
Wealth:  A Brief Historical Overview, in RACE AND WEALTH DISPARITIES, supra (laws
that prohibited blacks from owning property); M. Elizabeth Kirkland & Sheila R.
Peters, “Location, Location, Location” Residential Segregation and Wealth Disparity,
in RACE AND WEALTH DISPARITIES, supra (laws that enforced segregation); Dr. Ro-
land Mitchell & Dr. Reavis L. Mitchell, History and Education:  Mining the Gap, in
RACE AND WEALTH DISPARITIES, supra (public education laws and segregation);
Cecelia Tichi, Wealth Whiteout: Creative Writers Confront Whites’ Downward Mobility
in America’s Newest Gilded Age, in RACE AND WEALTH DISPARITIES, supra (bank-
ruptcy and property taxation); Kenneth K. Wong, Federalism and Equity:  Evolution
of Federal Educational Policy, in RACE AND WEALTH DISPARITIES, supra (“No Child
Left Behind” federal legislation).
2. See, e.g., Terry Carter, Divided Justice, NAT’L B. ASS’N MAG., Jan./Feb. 1999,
at 16-17 (reporting that 80.7 percent of white attorneys and 59.1 percent of black
attorneys polled were “hopeful” that the justice system would eliminate racial bias).
1219
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In response to the prevalent view that American law and legal
institutions are class and color blind, this Article provides examples
of how legal institutions sometimes do create and maintain racial-
ized wealth disparities.  The Article offers examples of this phe-
nomenon by examining a sequence of federal judicial decisions, the
federal taxing statutes, the role of legal education, and access to
legal services.  These examples are instructive because they cut
across a broad spectrum of components of the American legal sys-
tem.  By revisiting issues of race and wealth in different legal set-
tings from the Constitution to federal cases, the tax system, and
legal education and practice, this Article confirms that race and
wealth are both involved in legal outcomes and ignored by legal
actors and institutions in a systematic way.  Legal actors and citi-
zens of all vocations need to look more critically at the American
legal landscape and critique the influence of race and wealth.
America’s foundational aspirations toward equality and neutral-
ity allow legal actors to ignore the effect that race and wealth dis-
parities have upon law and the legal system, even when those
actors acknowledge how often law fails to achieve these ideals.  Le-
gal realists,3 critical legal theorists,4 critical race theorists,5 feminist
theorists,6 and others have noted the contradiction between legal
doctrines and legal realities.  Yet, despite its contradictions and
failures, the urge towards equality and neutrality creates opportu-
nities for change.  As E.P. Thompson observed, “people are not as
stupid as some  . . .  suppose them to be.  They will not be mystified
by the first man who puts on a wig.”7  For Thompson, neutrality
and equality provide opportunities to redress an unequal class sys-
tem even while these concepts also protect ruling class interests.
Thompson reasons that a “partial and unjust” law cannot gain pop-
3. See, e.g., KARL N. LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE: REALISM IN THEORY AND IN
PRACTICE  (1962); MAX  RADIN, LAW AS LOGIC AND EXPERIENCE (1940).
4. See, e.g., MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (1987);
GARY MINDA, POSTMODERN LEGAL MOVEMENTS: LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE AT THE
CENTURY’S END (1995).
5. See, e.g., CRITICAL RACE THEORY:  THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE
MOVEMENT (Kimberle´ Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995); CRITICAL RACE THEORY:  THE
CUTTING EDGE (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds., 2d ed. 2001); RICHARD DEL-
GADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY:  AN INTRODUCTION (2001).
6. See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE
STATE (1989); MARI J. MATSUDA, WHERE IS YOUR BODY? AND OTHER ESSAYS ON
RACE, GENDER AND THE  LAW (1996); PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF
RACE  & RIGHTS  (1996).
7. English judges wear wigs, so Thompson’s reference is to the role of law (repre-
sented by the man in the wig) in perpetuating or combating injustice. See E.P.
THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS:  THE ORIGIN OF THE BLACK ACT 262–63 (1975).
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ular support and so is not useful in maintaining class hierarchy.8
Thus, the aspiration for universality and equity can sometimes
force law to follow its “own logic and criteria of equity.”9
THE AMERICAN CONFLICT BETWEEN EQUALITY, NEUTRALITY,
AND ASSIGNED RACE ROLES
From its beginnings, the American legal system has articulated
two distinct, yet contradictory, views of human relations.  The Dec-
laration of Independence aspired to equality among people and
neutral application of law.10  Yet at the same time, Article I, section
2 of the United States Constitution provided that the census shall
count “the whole Number of free Persons, including those bound
to Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed,
three fifths of all other Persons.”11  This constitutional provision
allocated roles by race for the construction of political rights: Indi-
ans outside American society; black slaves; and white male full citi-
zens, whether free or bound for a term of years.
Ironically, neutrality and equality can support subordination and
hierarchy.  Anatole France illustrated this point when he sarcasti-
cally applauded the majestic equalitarianism of the law, which “for-
bids the rich as well as the poor to sleep under bridges, to beg in
the streets, and to steal bread.”12
In 1943, Robert Hale echoed France’s sentiment, as he wrote
about the law’s role in creating unequal bargaining relationships
and unequal wealth effects.  Hale explained that wealth gives its
owner control over his or her own life and leisure and over other
people’s lives as well.13  Hale illustrated this control of the wealthy
8. Id.
9. Id.  Thompson allows that a legal system may not achieve neutrality and
fairness:
It is true that certain categories of person may be excluded from this logic
(as children or slaves), that other categories may be debarred from access to
parts of the logic (as women or, for many forms of eighteenth-century law,
those without certain kinds of property), and that the poor may often be
excluded, through penury, from the law’s costly procedures.
Id.
10. “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal; that
they are endowed by their Creator, with certain unalienable Rights, that among these
are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.” THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE
para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
11. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
12. Anatole France, Le Lys Rouge [The Red Lily], reprinted in JOHN BARTLETT,
FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 655 (1980).
13. Robert L. Hale, Bargaining, Duress, and Economic Liberty, 43 COLUM. L.
REV. 603, 626-28 (1943).
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over the working classes through the greater bargaining power that
capital has over labor, especially low-skilled workers.14  This une-
qual bargaining power leads to the inequitable distribution of
wealth as those with control over capital can extract work from
others without just compensation.15  As seen in Hale’s work, legal
neutrality claims that law has no effect on this wealth distribu-
tion.16  Instead, law simply protects property rights and freedom of
contract.17  Under this concept of legal neutrality, other institu-
tions, for example the market, fuel the wealth distribution occa-
sioned by unequal bargaining power.
Hale rejected the claim that legal neutrality has no wealth ef-
fects.  Rather, Hale pointed out that legal rules lead to particular
wealth distribution patterns and that different legal rules create dif-
ferent wealth distribution patterns while still protecting property
rights and freedom of contract.18  For Hale, the allegedly neutral
system of American property and inheritance laws does more than
merely protect private property and freedom of contract; these
laws also give property owners power over workers to the detri-
ment of most Americans.19
Sixty years after Hale, Stephen J. Rose, in a book and poster
depicting the interrelationships of income, wealth, occupation,
race, gender, and household type, showed that five percent of the
United States population owns sixty percent of the nation’s
wealth.20  Using an icon representing 160,000 people as its primary
unit, the left side of the poster portrayed the American population
by income up to $125,000.21  Ninety-three percent of the American
population earned at or below this $125,000 mark.22  Ninety-three
percent of the American population is able to fit within the physi-
cal frame of the approximately two by three foot poster.23
14. Id. at 626-27.
15. Id. at 627-28.
16. Id. at 626.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 628.  “Bargaining power would be different were it not that the law en-
dows some with rights that are more advantageous than those with which it endows
others.” Id. at 627-28.
19. Id. at 627-28.
20. STEPHEN J. ROSE, SOCIAL STRATIFICATION IN THE UNITED STATES:  THE NEW
AMERICAN PROFILE POSTER 25 (2000); see also generally Collins & Margo, supra note
1. R
21. ROSE, supra note 20, at 25. R
22. Id.
23. Id.
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In order to expand the chart at the same 160,000 people per icon
scale and include those who earn combined incomes of up to
$300,000, the poster must add eight feet in height.24  Few icons pop-
ulate this extended chart representing people who earn more than
$125,000 annually.25  In order to reflect the 150,000 households
with more than $1 million in yearly income, the poster must grow
three stories high.26
Although Rose’s poster tells a different story, the American
myth perpetuates the idea that anyone can climb those three sto-
ries in one lifetime.  This belief coexists with public rules and pri-
vate practices that have tied wealth to race for generations.  As a
result, non-whites are even less likely to move out of poverty than
whites.
The disparate, distributional result that ties race and wealth has
been supported throughout American history by government pro-
grams.  The United States began as a slave nation, and the end of
slavery did not break the tie between race and wealth.  Most peo-
ple are aware of the failures of the post-Civil War Reconstruction
and the emergence of the Jim Crow system of segregation.27  Few
are as aware of how the liberal New Deal tied race and wealth.
The New Deal introduced the notion of an economic safety net
into American politics.  As such it pulled many Americans from
poverty.  But the New Deal also excluded agricultural and domes-
tic workers from that economic safety net because those occupa-
tions served as a “neutral” proxy for race.28  After World War II,
the government continued to enrich its citizens based on race
through the Federal Housing Administration, which made home
24. Id.
25. The Y axis (the vertical line running along the left hand side of the poster)
shows income up to $125,000.  The X axis shows the U.S. population in increments of
160,000 up to ninety-three percent of the population. Id.
26. Id.
27. Angela P. Harris, Equality Trouble:  Sameness and Difference in Twentieth-
Century Race Law, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1923, 1931-33 (2000).
28. See MARTHA R. MAHONEY, JOHN O. CALMORE & STEPHANIE M. WILDMAN,
SOCIAL JUSTICE:  PROFESSIONALS, COMMUNITIES, AND LAW 451-571 (2003) [hereinaf-
ter MAHONEY, ET AL., SOCIAL JUSTICE] (discussing livelihood and the economic
safety net); see generally IRA KATZNELSON, WHEN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION WAS
WHITE:  AN UNTOLD HISTORY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY
AMERICA (2005) (reporting how U.S. social programs favored whites); William E.
Forbath, Constitutional Welfare Rights:  A History, Critique, and Reconstruction, 69
FORDHAM L. REV. 1821 (2001); Joel F. Handler, “Constructing the Political Specta-
cle”:  Interpretation of Entitlements, Legalization, and Obligations in Social Welfare
History, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 899 (1990).
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ownership available to working class whites, while excluding black
buyers through redlining and other exclusionary practices.29
These government programs increased white family well-being
significantly while systematically excluding blacks, Indians, and
others.  Yet, because each program based exclusions on seemingly
neutral factors, many whites have never understood the role their
race played in their rise from poverty to middle class status.
Hale argues that contract law is driven by bargaining power and
made up of seemingly class neutral rules that actually shift bargain-
ing power to owners of capital and away from labor.  Favoring the
wealthy over workers is not the stated justification for these rules.
Instead, proponents justify these rules as the most efficient means
of supporting an important social goal called freedom of contract.
The rules ignore the fact that, without true bargaining power, there
can be no freedom of contract.  Thus the rich and the poor share in
the same freedoms which somehow mysteriously tend to favor the
wealthy.  The New Deal developed seemingly race-neutral rules
that actually shifted wealth away from blacks and towards whites.
These rules were not presented as part of an effort to bring the
white working class into the middle class while leaving black
America in Depression conditions for another forty years.  Yet, by
restricting benefits to whites either explicitly—as in the federal
home mortgage arena—or implicitly—as in Social Security—these
government programs helped ensure that government benefits
would enforce an income and wealth gap between white Ameri-
cans and their non-white counterparts.  These gaps, first between
the wealthy and everyone else (which is enforced by contract law
among other legal rules) and between black wealth and white
wealth (perpetuated by historical gaps in government benefits), oc-
cur in a wide range of assets, including access to education.
29. For more on the private and public practices that operated to deny black
Americans home ownership, see generally Collins & Margo, supra note 1, and Kirk-
land & Peters, supra note 1. See also generally SHERYLL CASHIN, THE FAILURES OF
INTEGRATION:  HOW RACE AND CLASS ARE UNDERMINING THE AMERICAN DREAM
(2004); DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGA-
TION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (1993); MELVIN L. OLIVER & THOMAS
M. SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH/WHITE WEALTH: A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL IN-
EQUALITY (1995); Margalynne Armstrong, Race and Property Values in Entrenched
Segregation, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1051 (1998); Martha R. Mahoney, Segregation,
Whiteness, and Transformation, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1659 (1995); Florence Wagman
Roisman, Teaching Important Property Concepts: Teaching About Inequality, Race,
and Property, 46 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 665 (2002).
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FACIAL NEUTRALITY REINFORCING HIERARCHY IN JUDICIAL
DECISION-MAKING
Two judicial decisions announced twenty-five years apart illus-
trate how equality and neutrality can veil the reinforcement of ex-
isting wealth inequities. Rodriguez v. San Antonio School District30
and Hopwood v. Texas31 both concerned the Texas public educa-
tion system. Rodriguez dealt with elementary and secondary edu-
cation;32 Hopwood grappled with higher education in the state’s
premier law school.33
Rodriguez challenged the practice of funding local school dis-
tricts through property taxes.34  In a property tax system, rich
school districts are able to raise more funds through taxation than
poor districts.  Because rich districts include land and buildings
with higher property values, these districts are able to raise greater
funding while putting less tax burden on each taxpayer within the
district.  As Douglas Reed explained, “property-rich districts could
generate significant revenues for education (at relatively low tax
rates), while property-poor districts could produce only very small
amounts of revenue (while taxing themselves at comparatively high
rates).”35  This uneven and unequal funding scheme led three law
professors to argue that state wealth, rather than school district
wealth, was a better measure of funding per student.36  The profes-
sors urged that “children are classless . . . no child of tender years is
capable of meriting more or less than another.”37  The Edgewood
School District’s budget, where Mr. Rodriguez’s children attended
school, spent only two-thirds as much money per student as com-
pared to the Alamo Heights School District’s per-student expendi-
tures.38  The residents of the Edgewood District were
30. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 12 (1973).
31. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996).
32. See generally Wong, supra note 1, for further discussion of elementary and
secondary education.
33. Access to education provides a form of wealth. See Mitchell & Mitchell, supra
note 1. R
34. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 4-5.
35. Douglas S. Reed, Twenty-Five Years After Rodriguez: School Finance Litiga-
tion and the Impact of the New Judicial Federalism, 32 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 175, 175
(1988).
36. JOHN E. COONS, WILLIAM H. CLUNE III & STEPHEN D. SUGARMAN, PRIVATE
WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCATION 2 (1970); Edward B. Foley, Rodriguez Revisited:
Constitutional Theory and School Finance, 32 GA. L. REV. 475, 481 (1998).
37. COONS, CLUNE & SUGARMAN, supra note 36, at 419. R
38. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 11-12.
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predominantly Mexican-American; in contrast, the residents of
Alamo Heights were predominantly “Anglo.”39
Although the factual record fully apprised the Supreme Court
concerning the wealth and ethnic differences between the
Edgewood and Alamo Districts, the majority explicitly rejected a
link between the “property-poor districts” and race.  Instead the
majority declared: “Nor does it now appear that there is any more
than a random chance that racial minorities are concentrated in
property-poor districts.”40  Citing a Connecticut-based study, the
majority also rejected associating economic disadvantage and
“property-poor” districts.41  In ruling against the funding challenge,
the majority wrote:
In sum, to the extent that the Texas system of school financing
results in unequal expenditures between children who happen to
reside in different districts, we cannot say that such disparities
are the product of a system that is so irrational as to be invidi-
ously discriminatory. . . .  The complexity of these problems is
demonstrated by the lack of consensus with respect to whether
it may be said with any assurance that the poor, the racial mi-
norities, or the children in overburdened core-city school dis-
tricts would be benefited by abrogation of traditional modes of
financing education.42
Thus, in 1973 the Supreme Court let Texas continue to fund its
school districts through local property taxes, thereby ensuring that
rich school districts would spend more on their elementary and sec-
ondary school systems than poor school districts.  The Court re-
fused to find any connection between wealth and race or ethnicity,
nor did it find a connection between wealth and educational
resources.
In 1996, the Fifth Circuit decided Hopwood v. Texas,43 a chal-
lenge to the admissions policy at the University of Texas School of
Law.  Children who attended kindergarten in Texas at the time
Rodriguez was decided were twenty-five years old when the Hop-
wood litigation began.  Thus, Texans who were in the applicant
pool to attend the University of Texas Law School grew up in an
educational system that had allowed vast differentials in their pub-
licly funded education because of Rodriguez.  In addition, these
39. Id. at 12.
40. Id. at 57.
41. Id. at 23.
42. Id. at 54-55, 56.
43. 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
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Texan applicants grew up shortly after the University of Texas de-
segregated, although for the vast majority of its history the Univer-
sity of Texas was a segregated institution.44
Even though the University of Texas and its law school had en-
ded de jure segregation, enrollment at the University remained
predominantly white.45  During the Hopwood era, the law school
embarked on an affirmative action plan meant to address this de
facto segregation.46
In Hopwood, the Fifth Circuit characterized the question before
it as whether “in order to increase the enrollment of certain fa-
vored classes of minority students, the University of Texas School
of Law discriminates in favor of those applicants by giving substan-
tial racial preferences in its admissions program.”47  The court re-
jected the University of Texas Law School’s admission policy as
unconstitutional because it produced an entering class containing
students who did not meet a supposedly neutral and objective stan-
dard of merit.48  The court’s reliance on supposedly neutral tests
did not reflect the race and class issues inherent in the Texas public
school system.
Both Rodriguez and Hopwood reflect a kind of neutrality.  As
Anatole France might have said, in Rodriguez the law is equalita-
rian and neutral when it allows all parents to spend whatever funds
they want on their children’s education, so long as they have the
money to do so.  Further, the law remains neutral when the gradu-
ates of under-funded schools are subject to the same tests as gradu-
ates of well-funded schools in order to gain admission to the state
university’s law school.  Each decision reflects a theoretical neu-
trality that together create a real world differential in access to
public education at the primary, secondary, and graduate levels.
44. The famous Supreme Court decision in Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950),
challenged that segregation and served as one of the building blocks in the litigation
strategy that led to Brown v. Board of  Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See also
A’Lelia R. Henry, Perpetuating Inequality: Plessy v. Ferguson and the Dilemma of
Black Access to Public and Higher Education, 27 J.L. & EDUC. 47, 66-71 (1998) (dis-
cussing the cumulative negative effect of Rodriguez, Hopwood, and other “color-
blind” holdings on higher education for black students).
45. Hopwood v. Texas, 861 F. Supp. 551, 556 (W.D. Tex. 1994), rev’d in part and
dismissed in part, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
46. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 935-38.
47. Id. at 934.
48. In 1993 resident (Texan) white applicants had a mean grade point average of
3.53 and a law school admissions test score of 164.  Mexican Americans averaged 3.27
and 158, respectively; blacks averaged 3.25 and 157. Id. at 937 n.7.
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The law acknowledges that a rule allowing only whites to enter
the University of Texas is not neutral.49  But the Fifth Circuit em-
ployed the shield of neutrality by demanding that the University of
Texas employ an admission policy for local Texas residents that
heavily relied on test scores.50  Many view the use of test scores as
neutral, even though the judges received evidence of these tests’
race and class bias.51  Further, the differences in educational oppor-
tunity on the primary and secondary levels meant that there would
be different test scores by race even if the tests themselves had no
race bias.
From a doctrinal perspective, Rodriguez and Hopwood illustrate
Hale’s two observations that (1) neutrality can mask redistributive
effects, and (2) different rules could create different wealth effects
without harming fairness, freedom of contract, or property owner-
ship.  Read together, Rodriguez and Hopwood offer a microcosmic
view of children denied educational opportunities under the guise
of neutral law.52
49. See Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 634 (1950) (“It may be argued that exclud-
ing petitioner from that school is no different from excluding white students from the
new law school. This contention overlooks realities.”).
50. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 962.
51. For more on testing and bias, see NICHOLAS LEMANN, THE BIG TEST: THE
SECRET HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN MERITOCRACY (1999); William C. Kidder & Jay
Rosner, How the SAT Creates “Built-in Headwinds”: An Educational and Legal Anal-
ysis of Disparate Impact, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 131, 133-34 (2002) (describing
how the process of selecting and developing SAT questions exacerbates that test’s
disparate impact on African-American and Chicano test-takers); Daria Roithmayr,
Deconstructing the Distinction Between Bias and Merit, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1449 (1997).
52. For further discussion of the race and class implications of Rodriguez, see gen-
erally Goodwin Liu, The Parted Paths of School Desegregation and School Finance
Litigation, 24 LAW & INEQ. 81 (2006), arguing that Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S.
189 (1973) and Rodriguez together presented the opportunity to fuse school finance
litigation and desegregation, though the Court rejected that opportunity. See also
Susan H. Bitensky, We “Had a Dream” in Brown v. Board of Education . . ., 1996
DET. C. L. REV. 1, 16 (arguing that Rodriguez must be overturned in order for the
United States to realize the full promise of Brown); Michael Heisse, Equal Educa-
tional Opportunity, Hollow Victories, and the Demise of School Finance Equity The-
ory:  An Empirical Perspective and an Alternative Explanation, 32 GA. L. REV. 543,
575 (1998) (discussing how Rodriguez forced proponents of school finance equity at
the federal level into state court battles for adequacy); Paula J. Lundberg, State Courts
and School Funding:  A Fifty-State Analysis, 63 ALB. L. REV. 1101, 1145 (2000) (argu-
ing that the states which are less urban, have a higher per-capita income, and have
greater state constitutional protection have been and will be more likely to reject the
Rodriguez holding and invalidate their own funding schemes); Denise C. Morgan, The
Less Polite Questions: Race, Place, Poverty and Public Education, 1998 ANN. SURV.
AM. L. 267 (arguing that to improve public education contrary to the traditional litiga-
tion preceding and including Rodriguez, litigation that is capable of fusing race, pov-
erty, and space must be encouraged).
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STATUTORY LAW: RACE, WEALTH, AND TAXES
As the discussion of Rodriguez and Hopwood above illuminates,
American legal institutions sometimes create seemingly neutral
rules that actually enforce race and wealth roles.  For example, ac-
cess to education is a type of wealth.53  The Rodriguez and Hop-
wood decisions each articulate neutral rules that, when combined,
distribute public education in skewed ways.  Yet, as Hale pointed
out, the unequal distribution of wealth is hard to detect.  Neutral
rules serve to mask unequal wealth distribution and to make the
skewed distribution possible.54
Until now this Article has looked at a series of rules and govern-
ment policies that purported to be race and class neutral, such as
freedom of contract and law school admissions.  This Article now
turns to a law that does not purport to represent class neutrality:
the federal tax code.  There are a number of reasons to consider
tax laws as statutes with both race and wealth effects.  The first and
most obvious reason that the United States tax system might have
both race and wealth effects is that the system clearly implicates
both income and wealth distribution.  At its most basic level, the
gift and estate tax laws explicitly tax large estates as they pass from
generation to generation, and the income tax uses progressive rates
as income rises.  A second reason for expecting to see differences
based on race and wealth in the United States taxing statutes is
that both the income gap between blacks and whites and the
wealth gap are dramatic in this country.55  Because both the in-
come and wealth gaps are so extreme by race,56 effects of the inter-
section of race and wealth might appear more readily in a statute
that deals directly with income and wealth.
The observations contained in the paragraphs above argue that
the American tax system is both race-neutral as written and race-
and wealth-sensitive as structured.  In fact, as one would expect, it
turns out that the United States tax system has a series of rules that
result in blacks and whites at the same income level, education
level, marital status, number of children, and region of residence
paying very different amounts of federal income tax, with blacks
53. For more on education as a form of wealth, see generally Wong, supra note 1, R
and Mitchell & Mitchell, supra note 1. R
54. Hale, supra note 13, at 628. R
55. ROSE, supra note 20; see also Beverly Moran & William Whitford, A Black R
Critique of the Internal Revenue Code, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 751, 770.
56. See generally Moran & Whitford, supra note 55. R
\\server05\productn\F\FUJ\34-4\FUJ408.txt unknown Seq: 12  6-SEP-07 9:20
1230 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXIV
paying more.57  This differential by race is achieved through a num-
ber of mechanisms.  One way that the distribution is achieved is
through the technical rules and how those rules interact with how
people live.58  Another way the distribution is achieved is through
the silence that allows the rules to play out differently by race with-
out any movement toward reform.59  A third factor that helps
maintain wealth distribution by race is the shaping of public opin-
ion so that Americans accept rules that favor the wealthy as neutral
rules that favor us all.60
Technically, the distribution of tax benefits to whites and away
from blacks is achieved through a series of credits, exclusions, and
deductions that all work so that the greatest benefits go to people
who fit a white profile and the lowest benefits go to people who fit
other profiles.61  A quick example of this phenomenon is apparent
in the bundle of benefits that apply to home ownership.62
A vast gap in home ownership exists between whites and
blacks.63  The gap in home ownership is a direct result of a wide
range of government policies from the creation of the Republic to
date.64  Thus, it can hardly be argued that home ownership is a vol-
untary act or that black people have purposefully eschewed home
ownership.  Instead, black people are now, and have been, consist-
ently shut out of the home ownership market by a series of laws,
rules, and private policies.
The Internal Revenue Code gives tremendous benefits to home
ownership.  The cost of financing a home is completely deductible
for most Americans.  Property taxes that support local schools are
also deductible.  If the house goes up in value, the owners can draw
money out of the house through borrowing, not pay any tax on the
receipt of the borrowed funds, and deduct the payment of mort-
gage interest.  When the owner sells the home, the gain realized
from any increased value or equity is usually received completely
tax-free.
57. Id. at 754-55.
58. Id. at 754.
59. Id. at 753-54.
60. Id. at 752.
61. The home mortgage interest deduction presents one example of this phenome-
non. See id. at 754; see also Beverly Moran, Setting an Agenda for the Study of Tax
and Black Culture, 21 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 779, 783 (1999); William C.
Whitford, Remarkable, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1639, 1645 (1998).
62. Moran & Whitford, supra note 55, at 775-83. R
63. See generally Collins & Margo, supra note 1; Kirkland & Peters, supra note 1. R
64. See generally Collins & Margo, supra note 1. R
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The combination of the tremendous tax benefits for home own-
ership and the private practices and policies that kept blacks from
that home ownership65 shows how the intersection of a neutral law
with a race-charged situation compounds race effects.  The inter-
section of the law and the reality of how people live allows the
race-neutral law to change wealth outcomes by race.
As E.P. Thompson might tell us, the intersection of race and
wealth in the United States tax laws is best achieved if the law is
supported by public opinion.  For example, support for such con-
cepts as freedom of property and freedom of contract helps mask
how the law serves to create wealth based on bargaining power.  In
the case of tax legislation, manipulation of public opinion and soci-
etal ignorance of racial hierarchy both contribute to attitudes that
veil recognition of the tax law’s role in maintaining wealth
disparities.
One illustration of how public relations can manipulate public
opinion for political ends in federal tax legislation is provided by
Marjorie Kornhauser.66  Her article presents an early example of
the still-current political phenomenon of small, well-financed
groups influencing tax legislation through lobbying, the media, and
rhetorical appeals to the “common man.”67  Kornhauser shows
Americans reacting completely outside their class interests when
dealing with tax policy.68
Kornhauser’s work concerns the repeal of certain public report-
ing requirements that made information on wealthy taxpayers’ in-
come accessible to the general public.69  Kornhauser opines that
the average American had nothing to lose from the public report-
ing requirement.70  In contrast, wealthy Americans felt vulnerable
in the face of public revelations of their holdings.71  Even though
they represented a numeric minority, the campaign the wealthy
mounted against the disclosure rules gained wide popular sup-
port.72  The wealthy were able to construct a story that resonated
65. CASHIN, supra note 29, at 3-38. R
66. See generally Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Shaping Public Opinion and the Law in
the 1930’s:  How a “Common Man” Campaign Ended a Rich Man’s Law 2 (Tulane
Public Law Research Paper No. 06-02, 2006) available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
880383; see also generally Collins & Margo, supra note 1; Kirkland & Peters, supra R
note 1. R
67. Kornhauser, supra note 66, at 2. R
68. Id. at 58.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 58-59.
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with average Americans who came to identify with those wealthy
taxpayers but were actually harmed by the provision.73
Contemporary debates over the estate tax present a more cur-
rent example of the same crossover identification phenomenon.
The estate tax is nothing if not a tax that directly targets upper class
families seeking to make intergenerational wealth transfers. Yet,
even when commentators assured the public that only one percent
of the population would ever confront the gift and estate tax, a
mass abolition movement arose against the so-called “death” tax.74
What Professor Kornhauser’s work illustrates and what the pub-
lic outcry against the “death tax” reflects is how the great Ameri-
can cultural urge toward neutrality and equality masks, as Hale and
France both suggested, a tremendous class-based privilege.  The
cultural concern for equality and neutrality serves as both a
strength and weakness.  In its best light, the culture fosters empa-
thy with those less fortunate and a willingness to sacrifice for the
greater good.  At its worst, it supports a type of silence that pre-
vents Americans from seeing, and therefore discussing, ways to ac-
tually achieve that neutrality and equality.  This silencing dynamic
is evident in legal education.
LEGAL EDUCATION: TRAINING GROUND FOR
CONTINUED SILENCE
Wealth disparities and race both play marginal roles in the law
school curriculum.75  Although all first year law students study sub-
73. Id.
74. The estate tax currently affects less than 1 percent of families, and it is the
most progressive tax in the country because its impact is almost entirely on
the nation’s richest families . . . .  At the moment, the government imposes a
tax of about 46 percent on estates worth more than $2 million, or more than
$4 million in the case of couples.
Edmund L. Andrews, G.O.P. Fails in Attempt to Repeal Estate Tax, N.Y. TIMES, June
9, 2005, at C1.
75. bell hooks describes class in America as the subject the culture does not ad-
dress.  “Nowadays it is fashionable to talk about race or gender; the uncool subject is
class.” BELL HOOKS, WHERE WE STAND: CLASS MATTERS vii (2000) (grieving that
greed sets “the standard for how we live and interact in everyday life”).  Her com-
ment is reminiscent of Patricia J. Williams’s description of race as the elephant in the
room that gets tiptoed around, also not discussed. PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE AL-
CHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 49 (1991).  Although both wealth and race tend to be
ignored in law school classrooms, several good casebooks are available on these sub-
jects, including DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW (5th ed. 2004);
EMMA C. JORDAN & ANGELA P. HARRIS, ECONOMIC JUSTICE:  RACE, GENDER,
IDENTITY AND ECONOMICS (2005); and JUAN PEREA, RICHARD DELGADO, ANGELA
P. HARRIS & STEPHANIE M. WILDMAN, RACE AND RACES: CASES AND RESOURCES
FOR A DIVERSE AMERICA (2d ed. 2007).
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jects that raise wealth and race issues, legal educators rarely teach
those subjects in ways that raise those concerns.  Instead, legal
pedagogy adopts a mode of “perspectivelessness,” reinforcing the
ideal that legal discourse is objective and analytical.76  Perspective-
lessness supports the myth of legal neutrality.  Although legal
scholars like Hale have been very explicit about the role of wealth
in American law,77 and critical race theory has been equally ex-
plicit about the role race plays in American legal institutions,78
both topics remain relegated to boutique seminar courses.  Stu-
dents can, and often do, study law for three years without ever con-
sidering either wealth or race as legitimate topics of study.
The omission of race and wealth disparities from the core law
school curriculum reinforces its invisibility in other parts of the
profession, thereby supporting the kinds of judicial decisions and
statutes discussed in the preceding sections.  As E.P. Thompson ob-
served, “class is something which in fact happens.”79  When class
just “happens” in the law school classroom without any study or
comment, legal educators train the next generation of lawyers to
ignore these fundamental issues of fairness and their implications
for democracy.80
A student writing exercise provides one example of the absence
of basic knowledge about wealth disparity within the context of
legal education.  Upon finishing a unit on work and care giving,
which included readings on the United States’ economy and how it
is managed to ensure unemployment, law students taking a Social
Justice Law class spent three minutes on a free write exercise, an-
swering the question: “What is class?”  Several essays discussed
physical classroom space.  Other students wrote about “class” as
76. Kimberle´ Williams Crenshaw, Foreword:  Toward a Race-Conscious Pedagogy
in Legal Education, 4 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 33, 35 (1994).
77. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Why Does the Constitution Lack Social and Eco-
nomic Guarantees?, 56 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1, 20 (2005) (supporting the idea that the
Nixon appointments to the Supreme Court removed the potential for a progressive
understanding of wealth distribution); see also Hale, supra note 13, at 626. R
78. See generally CRITICAL RACE THEORY:  THE CUTTING EDGE (Richard A. Del-
gado & Jean Stefancic eds., 2d ed. 1999); CRITICAL RACE THEORY:  THE KEY WRIT-
INGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT (Kimberle´ Crenshaw et al. eds., 1996).
79. E.P. THOMPSON, THE MAKING OF THE ENGLISH WORKING CLASS 9 (1964); see
also Martha R. Mahoney, Class and Status in American Law: Race, Interest, and the
Anti-Transformation Cases,  76 S. CAL. L. REV. 799, 805 (2003) (arguing that “when
law ignores class while claiming to protect white workers, it gives authority to the
claim that whites are harmed by the advent of people of color”).
80. See Stephanie M. Wildman, Democracy and Social Justice: Founding Centers
for Social Justice in Law Schools, 55 J. LEGAL EDUC. 252, 255-56 (2005) (describing
the connection between democracy and social justice issues like class and race).
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conduct, in the sense of classy, or snobby, or being embarrassed by
a lack of “classiness.”  Thus, even in the context of readings and
discussions of wealth disparities, these students’ initial reaction to
the term “class” was to envision meanings disconnected from
wealth.  When asked whether they spoke much about class and
wealth disparities in law school, the students answered “No.”
The silence on wealth and class in the law school classroom is not
limited to one school or one classroom.81  Indeed, that silence is so
pervasive that it impacts student career choices, and reduces the
number of law students who aspire to work for social justice.  Sev-
eral studies of legal education note that students enter law school
with a desire to work in the public interest.82  Yet by the time these
same students graduate, they have changed their vision of success
toward a corporate practice devoid of social justice issues.83
Class implicates relationships and power so that, while social
stratification statistics give a snapshot of one aspect of class or
wealth, these statistics fail to convey the ways people experience
class, how they identify themselves and others, or how power struc-
tures become replicated.84  Wealth’s invisibility in legal education is
part of how class “happens.”  When class just “happens,” the fail-
ure to pay attention replicates and reinforces existing structures.85
The replication and reinforcement of these existing structures in-
fluences the development of law, legal theory, and the next genera-
tion of legal professionals.
81. Margaret Montoya illustrates another example of missed learning opportuni-
ties for the whole class, because prevailing assumptions in the classroom prevented
the recognition of wealth disparities. See Margaret E. Montoya, Mascaras, Trenzas, y
Grenas: Un/Masking the Self While Un/Braiding Latina Stories and Legal Discourse,
17 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 185, 192 (1994).
82. See ROBERT GRANFIELD, MAKING ELITE LAWYERS:  VISIONS OF LAW AT
HARVARD AND BEYOND 3 (1992) (describing students’ changing view of career
goals); ROBERT STOVER, MAKING IT AND BREAKING IT:  THE FATE OF PUBLIC IN-
TEREST COMMITMENT DURING LAW SCHOOL 13 (1989) (reporting that one-third of
beginning first-year law students said they hoped to work in public interest jobs and
one-sixth of graduating third years expressed the same hopes; the number of students
who expressed commitment to public interest jobs dropped by half during law
school).
83. See STOVER, supra note 82, at 13.  Note, however, that corporate law practice
need not be disconnected from social justice work.  Bob Egelko, 14 S.F. Law Firms
Pledge Free Work for Poor Clients: Judicial Nudge Prompts Commitment, S.F.
CHRON., Dec. 15, 2000, at A26 (describing the successful effort of Chief Judge
Marilyn Hall Patel, U.S. District Court in San Francisco, and Chief Justice Ronald
George, California Supreme Court, with the Bar Association of San Francisco to en-
courage law firms to commit a percentage of attorney time to pro bono work).
84. See Mahoney, supra note 79, at 805.
85. Id.
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Income and wealth inequalities exist for many reasons; law is
only one of those reasons.  Yet, as this Article shows, law is not a
trivial reason.  In many ways legal rules, especially those rules that
claim to support equality and neutrality, can mask the means for
supporting wealth and power differentials of all sorts.  Legal educa-
tion disserves the very people who need to understand both how
law supports and undercuts equality and neutrality.  Legal educa-
tion ignores the issues of race, class, and inequality through the
silence on these issues that permeates many classrooms.  As a re-
sult, future leaders lack the training that they need to even imagine
how law supports or undercuts true equality, much less how to ad-
dress those issues in any serious way.
ACCESS TO LAWYERS AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM:
A FORM OF WEALTH
This Article offers different definitions of wealth.  Some view in-
come as a proxy for wealth.  The discussion of the racial roles as-
signed by the Constitution makes race a type of political wealth,
defining who has a say in forming the elected government.  The
discussion of Rodriguez and Hopwood addressed education as a
form of wealth.  The racial allocation of government benefits in the
discussion of the federal tax laws illustrates how tax laws are struc-
tured.  These tax laws create wealth transfers from blacks with less
wealth to whites with more wealth, and the public financing of
housing does the same by reducing blacks’ access to the funds
needed to purchase housing and other types of wealth.
Access to lawyers and the legal system is another form of wealth.
A typical view of the provision of legal services would see legal
services as a value-free commodity that is governed by the market.
But as Hale pointed out, legal rules have tremendous impact on
the protection of property rights, the creation of bargaining power,
and the determination of wealth distribution.86  Just as legal rules
act to concentrate other types of wealth, such as education, hous-
ing, and tax benefits, legal resources are yet another type of wealth
that remains unevenly distributed by class and race.  Reginald
Heber Smith decried the notion of “one law for the rich and an-
other for the poor.”87  Indeed, Smith viewed freedom and equal
access to justice as inextricably intertwined.88
86. See Hale, supra note 13, at 628. R
87. REGINALD HEBER SMITH, JUSTICE AND THE POOR 3 (1919).
88. Id.
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Like Smith, President Jimmy Carter charged that legal resources
are inappropriately apportioned.  President Carter complained that
“ninety percent of lawyers serve only ten percent of the popula-
tion.”89  In a recent study by the National Legal Aid and Defenders
Association, researchers found that in California alone there was
roughly one legal aid attorney for every 10,000 economically disad-
vantaged Californians.90  Equal justice under law is a disregarded
ideal when access to lawyers is so skewed.91
The availability of lawyers to bring social justice cases on behalf
of individuals and communities affects both the nature of cases that
are brought into court and the legal rules that prevail.  Cruz Rey-
noso provides an example of the importance of lawyers for the pro-
tection and creation of wealth with his description of a New
Mexico program established to increase the number of Native
American lawyers.92  “Soon we started seeing cases coming out of
Arizona . . .  in which Native American tribes sued to receive water
that they were entitled to under treaties.  Rights mean nothing if
nobody enforces them.”93  Access to lawyers empowered the In-
dian community and allowed it to achieve rights that were previ-
ously not enforced because of a lack of legal resources.94  But
Indians are not the only poor people who are in need of legal ser-
vices.  In New Jersey, it is estimated that less than one percent of
all tenants have lawyers to help them in landlord tenant court.95
89. GRANFIELD, supra note 82, at 4 (1992).
90. See Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1785, 1786
(2001); Jose Padilla, Surviving 40 Years of Poverty Law Practice: Salvaging Justice,
Address at Santa Clara University Law School (Oct. 16, 2006).
91. A study released by Legal Services of New Jersey on October 13, 2006 finds
that over the past year nearly 120,000 low-income New Jersey residents attempted to
receive free legal assistance, but were turned away due to a lack of resources.  Legal
services providers are worried that the data underrepresent the problem because
many low-income people do not attempt to receive legal services when they need
them.  The report, “People Without Lawyers: New Jersey’s Civil Legal Justice Gap
Continues,” also found that ninety-nine percent of defendants in landlord-tenant evic-
tion cases at state courts were not represented by a lawyer.  Kate Conscarelli, Poor
Jerseyans Have Limited Access to Legal Aid, Study Finds, THE STAR LEDGER, Oct. 13,
2006.
92. Cruz Reynoso, Educational Equity, 36 UCLA L. REV. 107, 111 (1988).
93. Id.  Lawyers are not, however, a panacea for the ailments of disempowered
communities.  Marc Galanter, in a classic article, explains how the legal system is
stacked against the “have-nots” in society. See generally Marc Galanter, Why the
“Haves” Come out Ahead:  Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW &
SOC’Y REV. 95 (1974).
94. See Ralph W. Johnson, Indian Tribes and the Legal System, 72 WASH. L. REV.
1021, 1031 (1997) (noting that as “tribes have gained greater access to legal counsel,
courts have increased their focus on Indian issues”).
95. See Conscarelli, supra note 91. R
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How different would landlord-tenant relationships in New Jersey,
or in any other state, look if the parties approached the court with
equal access to legal resources?
The United States spends only $300 million on legal services to
serve over forty million poor citizens.96  By contrast, “[a] single law
firm, which represents maybe a hundred or so corporate clients,
earned . . . [one billion dollars].”97  The total profits of a half dozen
law firms exceed the total federal, state, and local expenditures for
legal representation for the poor.98
CONCLUSION
Louis Brandeis once warned that: “We can have democracy; in
this country; or we can have great wealth concentrated in the hands
of a few, but we can’t have both.”99  In the United States, race and
wealth are so intertwined that the wealthy few are also almost inva-
riably white.  If Brandeis is correct, and democracy cannot exist
alongside concentrated wealth, then perhaps wealth concentrated
by race presents an even greater threat than wealth that is concen-
trated through more random means.
Most disciplines seem to believe that law plays a role in creating
and maintaining wealth and race disparities.  This Article shows
that from the origins of the nation when the United States Consti-
tution explicitly established racial roles to the present, government
policy often directed wealth from Indians and blacks towards
whites.  This Article discussed one ironic aspect of legal method
that helps legal institutions and doctrines play their role in main-
taining race and wealth hierarchy—the aspiration to equality and
neutrality.  The examples of seemingly neutral rules having race
and wealth effects included Texas public education as sustained by
Rodriguez and Hopwood; the color-blind federal tax laws; the law
school classroom and its replication of silence on matters of class;
and access to justice as measured by the availability of lawyers’
services.
96. Justice Earl Johnson, Jr., Equal Access to Justice: Comparing Access to Justice
in the United States and Industrial Democracies, 24 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 583, 583-84
(2000).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. JOSEPH R. CONLIN, THE MORROW BOOK OF QUOTATIONS IN AMERICAN HIS-
TORY 48 (1984).
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This Article also reflects different definitions of wealth.  Human
beings held as slaves provided a form of wealth to their owners.100
Access to education develops human capital and is another form of
unevenly distributed wealth in this nation.101  Similarly, access to
legal services is denied to the poorest Americans.  Home owner-
ship, the bedrock of wealth for the American middle class, is very
skewed by race as a result of long-term public and private policies.
Thus, while other disciplines have a more focused definition of
wealth, the legal landscape invites a more encompassing view.
Richard Delgado has urged those in the legal academy to learn
from other disciplines in their effort to promote social change.102
He noted, for example, that post-colonial literature, searching for
ways to oppose imperial forces in Africa, Asia, and Latin America,
developed chronologically parallel to the civil rights tradition in the
United States, but “without much interchange between the two.”103
Law and legal institutions need assistance from other disciplines to
reveal the inconsistencies contained in the legal system and ulti-
mately to hold that system accountable.
100. See Anthony Paul Farley, Accumulation, 11 MICH. J. RACE & L. 51, 54 (2005)
(urging that the rule of law supports the primal scene of accumulation).
101. See generally Mitchell & Mitchell, supra note 1; Wong, supra note 1. R
102. Richard Delgado, Si Se Puede, But Who Gets the Gravy?, 11 MICH. J. RACE 9,
18-19 (2005).
103. Id. at 19.
